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ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS 
n Research shows that rent 
control incentivizes landlords 
to at least temporarily 
withdraw housing in response 
to price increases—the 
opposite of what 
policymakers intend. 
 
n Rent control is unlikely to 
be a standalone solution to the 
underlying problem plaguing 
expensive cities: chronic 
undersupply of housing.
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U.S. Sick Pay Mandates





After a long period of neglect, a new generation 
of policymakers and activists has embraced rent 
control as a solution to the housing affordability 
crisis plaguing America’s booming coastal cities. 
The national median rent for a one-bedroom 
apartment is $1,209 a month, but for some metro 
areas it is considerably higher. Urban residents 
suffering from the highest rents are mostly in 
wealthy, coastal cities, such as San Francisco 
($3,500), New York City ($2,860), San Jose 
($2,480), Los Angeles ($2,360), Oakland ($2,100), 
and Washington, D.C. ($2,160). In addition to 
sharing astronomically high rents, these cities also 
share another feature: rent control.
Rent-control regimes have operated in 
these six cities for the better part of 30 years, 
and they exist also in a host of smaller cities, 
chiefly in California, Maryland, and New Jersey. 
Undergraduate Economics 101 would have you 
think that rent control is essentially a rent freeze, 
but the reality is that rent control as practiced 
today has evolved into a far more complex system. 
The vast majority of today’s rent controls were 
instituted in the 1970s and early 1980s in response 
to the stagflation crisis, and are often referred to as 
rent stabilization, tenancy rent control, or second-
generation rent control to distinguish themselves 
from their much-maligned predecessor. Since these 
modern forms are really the only game in town, I 
refer to them herein as just rent control.
Policymakers claim that rent control can allow 
low- to moderate-wage workers to live close to 
jobs in expensive cities. They also claim that these 
rent-control policies would prevent families from 
being displaced by high rents into substandard 
housing. Even for families who stayed, the rent 
controls would mean that they could more easily 
afford other necessities, like food and health care. 
This concern applies particularly to low-income 
or fixed-income households, such as the elderly 
and disabled. For example, Oakland’s rent control 
ordinance claims to address a “severe housing 
affordability crisis,” in which “60 percent of . . .  
residents are renters, who would not be able 
to locate affordable housing within the city if 
displaced.”
The regimes share four prominent features:
1) The city grants landlords and tenants some 
freedom to negotiate a starting rent, and then 
caps subsequent rent increases according to 
agency decree or prescribed formula. This 
process, called vacancy decontrol, ranges from 
restrained in New York City and Washington, 
D.C., to completely unrestricted in California.
2) There is automatic lease renewal for existing 
tenants, and landlords usually require “just-
cause” to evict a tenant. In practice, this means 
that landlords must prove to a rent board or 
court that tenants are being evicted for one of 
a predetermined list of reasons. This prevents 
landlords from turning over tenants at will and 
locking in new base rents in response to market 
shifts.
3) New buildings are exempt from rent control 
unless the landlord opts in. Policymakers fear 
discouraging new supply, so the rules control 
only existing buildings and commit to not 
extending controls further.
4) There are a series of landlord hardship 
provisions, where landlords may petition to 
pass certain operating expenses on to tenants in 
order to cover costs with reasonable profit.
Table 1 shows how the details vary across cities, 
but it also underscores how these systems share 
more policy similarities than differences.
These measures were largely intended to be 
temporary, but like many so-called temporary 
regimes, rent control is the answer to an emergency 
situation that never seems to end. One reason for 
rent control’s persistence is that it redistributes 
benefits from future tenants to present ones. One 
influential study found that, after rent control was 
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expanded to a new set of apartments 
in 1994 in San Francisco, tenants in 
affected buildings were 10–20 percent 
more likely to remain at their 1994 
address compared to tenants in the 
control group. Since rent increases are 
capped at less than the rate of inflation, 
these tenants were (and in some cases 
still are) effectively being subsidized 
to live in their controlled apartments 
for as long as they like. This creates a 
powerful pro-rent-control constituency 
that can be difficult for reform-minded 
policymakers to overcome.
This de facto subsidy to stay in 
place affects tenants’ labor market 
outcomes. One study shows that 
tenants absorb longer commutes 
instead of yielding their rent-controlled 
apartments, suggesting that keeping 
the subsidized housing is more 
valuable to them than moving closer 
to a new job or switching job markets 
altogether. Another study concluded 
that the stronger the local rent-control 
ordinance, the more likely a person was 
to limit their job search to local jobs. 
While rent control may allow workers 
to stay close to high-wage jobs in 
dense urban areas, it is not altogether 
clear that this is in the best interests of 
tenants or the economy in the long run.
Rent control’s distortionary effects 
also extend into housing supply. The 
policies in Table 1 collectively dampen 
landlords’ profits in the controlled 
market. In the case of San Francisco, 
landlords actually lose money since 
rent increases are capped at 60 percent 
of the inflation rate. In growing 
markets, the gap between what a 
landlord receives from a controlled 
apartment and from one that allows 
increases at the market rate compounds 
over time. Because tenants in this 
situation have strong incentives to stay 
longer under rent control, landlords in 
turn try to avoid tenants they suspect 
will be “long-stayers.”
My own research asks: How do 
landlords of rent-controlled properties 
change their housing supply when 
prices rise? Do they bring more units 
to market? Or, in San Francisco, at 
least, have policymakers imposed such 
burdens on landlords that they actually 
remove properties from the market? To 
motivate this question, Figure 1 shows 
evictions by quarter in San Francisco. 
The left axis shows Ellis Act evictions, 
by which landlords evict all tenants and 
withdraw an entire building from the 
market. Ostensibly, this occurs when 
landlords no longer want to operate 
their buildings, and so one might 
expect these evictions to rise when 
the economy slumps and vice versa. 
Instead, Ellis Act evictions spike during 
booms and fall during recessions. The 
right axis shows “just-cause” at-fault 
evictions, mostly tenants being evicted 
for delinquent rent. Since tenants in the 
controlled market are insulated from 
price increases during booms, one 
might expect this type of eviction to 
rise during recessions as tenants’ ability 
to pay falls. Instead, like Ellis Act 
evictions (albeit less sharply), at-fault 
evictions seem to rise in boom periods 
and level off in recessions.
These relationships suggest 
that landlords try to evade rent 
control restrictions when it would 
be especially profitable to do so, 
such as by converting rental units to 
condominiums. To test this hypothesis 
more definitively, I examine how two 
outcomes respond to market price 
increases that affected San Francisco 
neighborhoods differentially between 
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Los Angelesa Built before 
10/1/1978 and 






Oaklandb Built before 
1/1/1983 and 
has 4 or more 
units
Regional CPI 
rate, max of 
10%
Yes Yes 66
New York Cityc Built before 
1/1/1974 and 
has 6 or more 
units





new base rent 
capped at 20%d
Yes 47










Washington, DCf An apartment 
building built 
before 1/1/1976




new base rent 
capped at 10%
Yes 66
San Franciscog Built before 
6/13/1979 and 
has 2 or more 
units
60% of CPI, max 
of 7%
Yes Yes 72
Table 1  Major City Rent Control and Evictions Policies, October 2016
a Los Angeles Municipal Code Chapter 151. Office of the Mayor of Los Angeles (2016). 
b Oakland Municipal Code §8.22 et seq. Coverage figure comes Levin (2015). 
c New York State Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1997, 1997 New York Laws 116; Rent Act of 2015, 2015 New York Laws 20; New 
York State Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974, 1974 New York Laws 576 §5-a. Coverage figure comes from Sieg and Yoon 
(2016). 
d In both cities, landlords can appeal for a rent increase on new base rents of up to 30% if rents in comparable units are shown to 
be higher.
e  San José Municipal Code, Apartment Ordinance, Chapter 17.23. Coverage figure is from San José Municipal Ordinance No. 
29730, p. 1.
f  Code of the District of Columbia, Chapter 42. Coverage figure comes from Tatian and Williams (2011). 
g Asquith (forthcoming).
2003 and 2013. The first outcome 
is whether landlords tactically evict 
individual tenants to try to lock in 
higher rents from new tenants. More 
specifically, do landlords use just-
cause evictions to expel long-standing 
but lower-paying tenants? In spite 
of the pattern in the graph, I find no 
statistically significant evidence that 
landlords do this. Instead the evidence 
suggests that landlords of rent-
controlled apartments are less likely 
to turn over their tenants when prices 
rise.
The other outcome is whether 
controlled landlords outright exit the 
market in response to a price increase. 
I find that landlords do in fact respond 
to rising prices by withdrawing 
from the rental market via Ellis Act 
evictions (or, in smaller buildings, 
by withdrawing one unit from the 
market by claiming a relative needs to 
move in). This is a serious response, 
because by law the landlords must pay 
relocation fees and leave these units 
vacant (or filled by a family member) 
for at least three years or be subject to 
sanctions.
The two results confirm that 
the controlled market is distorted 
compared to “normal” housing 
markets. Landlords apparently expect 
to make such little money on the 
controlled market that they conclude 
it’s better to exit the market entirely, at 
least for a few years. If these landlords 
are thus incentivized to reduce supply 
as prices rise, it is hard to see how 
rent control improves housing market 
dynamics in these cities.
So, if existing evidence is that 
rent control is distortionary, why not 
abolish it? We have some evidence 
on what happens when rent control 
is repealed, and the result is generally 
salutary (see, for example, Autor, 
Palmer, and Pathak 2017). In January 
1995, a Massachusetts law banned 
rent controls, mostly affecting units 
in Boston, Cambridge, and Brookline. 
Property values in both decontrolled 
and never-controlled units rose, while 
property crime fell, especially in 
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areas with the highest concentration 
of controlled units. Additionally, 
segregation may have decreased.
However, the evidence is not clear 
on whether low- and middle-income 
tenants in fact would have been better 
off without rent control. So, what are 
other remedies to help these groups 
with housing costs? Government 
programs have included Section 8 
housing subsidies, low-income housing 
tax credits to finance new housing, 
and more recently, affordable housing 
mandates. These programs offer some 
help, particularly to poorer renters, 
but generally do little to address the 
housing needs of middle-income 
residents facing excessive rent burdens 
in expensive cities. Rent control’s lack 
of means testing is thus a political 
strength, because it can claim to be the 
rare policy that helps middle-income 
renters as well.
Despite popular demands for 
government intervention on rents, 
economists typically advocate for 
increasing the housing supply. 
Frustratingly, there is little empirical 
evidence on what happens to rent 
prices when the number of housing 
units in a neighborhood rises, with one 
study suggesting prices may not move 
much. Upjohn Institute economist 
Evan Mast, Philadelphia Fed economist 
Davin Reed, and I are currently 
studying this issue using data on unit-
level migrations, rents, and building 
openings.
Irrespective of the ultimate answer, 
rent control is here to stay. The current 
beneficiaries are well-organized, 
numerous, and know what they stand 
to lose from its repeal. The return of 
rent control to the scholarly agenda 
is thus propitiously timed to caution 
policymakers and a frustrated public 
that while soaring rent burdens are 
indeed approaching crisis levels in 
some places, rent control is a policy 
that has yet to deliver on its promise: 
affordable rents for all, not just for the 
few lucky enough to score a controlled 
apartment.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from data provided by the San Francisco Rent Board and Kate Pennington, 
University of California, Berkeley.
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The United States, Canada, and 
Japan are the only industrialized 
countries that do not provide universal 
access to paid sick leave. In these 
countries, sick pay is largely provided 
as a fringe benefit by employers on a 
voluntary basis (Heymann et al. 2010). 
In the United States, coverage rates are 
around 65 percent among full-time 
workers; low-income, part-time, and 
service sector workers have coverage 
rates of less than 20 percent (Susser 
and Ziebarth 2016). In a given week of 
the year, Susser and Ziebarth (2016) 
estimate that the total demand for paid 
sick leave sums to 10 percent of the 
workforce in the United States. 
To date, sick leave legislation has 
been passed in 11 states, the District of 
Columbia, and dozens of cities across 
the United States.1 They require that 
employees must have the right to earn, 
accumulate, and take sick days, typically 
up to seven days per year. Some critics 
are concerned that these mandates 
cause substantial wage reductions for 
employees, as well as job losses. Upjohn 
Early Career Research Awardee Nicolas 
R. Ziebarth of Cornell University and 
colleague Stefan Pichler of ETH Zurich 
published an examination of these sick 
pay mandates in the Journal of Human 
Resources (forthcoming). 
Findings
The research team used 
employment and wage data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics from 2001 
to 2016 to compare the labor market 
dynamics of the cities and states with 
mandates to “synthetic” control cities 
and states over time. The research 
assessed mandates in nine cities 
(including San Francisco, Washington, 
D.C., and New York City) and four 
states (Connecticut, California, 
Massachusetts, and Oregon).
The synthetic control group method 
(SCGM) is a relatively recent statistical 
method that allows researchers to draw 
causal inference. In this specific case, to 
benchmark the labor market dynamics 
of cities and states that implemented 
a mandate, the SCGM produces a 
very similar synthetic control group 
consisting of fractions of similar 
counties and states. 
Figure 1 illustrates the SCGM 
and some select findings. The left 
column shows the findings for three 
areas—San Francisco, King County, 
and New York City. The right column 
shows the findings for three select 
states, California, Massachusetts, and 
Oregon. The x-axis represents the 
normalized timeline in months up 
to and since the mandates became 
effective, and the y-axis shows the 
NOTE
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Labor Market Effects of 
U.S. Sick Pay Mandates
Nicolas R. Ziebarth and Stefan Pichler
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS 
n Over the past decade, dozens of cities, eleven states, and the District of Columbia 
have passed sick leave legislation.
n Sick pay mandates allow employees to earn and accumulate one hour of paid sick 
leave credit per 30–40 working hours.
n Comparing employment and wage dynamics in cities and states that mandated 
sick pay with synthetic control regions, there is no evidence that the mandates lead to 
major disruptions of local labor markets.
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The article draws on research from the forthcoming 
working paper, “Do Rent Increases Reduce the Housing 
Supply under Rent Control? Evidence from Evictions in 
San Francisco,” published by the Upjohn Institute.
https://doi.org/10.17848/wp19-296
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Figure 1  Employment Dynamics in Regions with Sick Pay Mandates Relative to Synthetic Control Regions
SOURCE: Pichler and Ziebarth (forthcoming).
NOTES: The solid vertical lines indicate the months when the mandates became effective, whereas the dashed vertical lines to the left indicate when the 
law was passed, and the dashed vertical lines to the right indicate when the “accrual period” was over.  Originally published in the Journal of Human 
Resources (forthcoming). © 2018 by the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System. Reprinted courtesy of the University of Wisconsin Press.
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outcome measure of interest—in this 
case, the number of private sector jobs 
as a share of the total population. The 
blue lines illustrate the private sector 
job development for the “treated” cities 
and states that implemented a mandate, 
and the orange lines illustrate the 
employment dynamics for the synthetic 
control counties or states. 
An important condition for the 
SCGM to produce valid findings is that 
the synthetic control group provides a 
valid imitation of the treatment group 
in premandate months; in other words, 
the solid and the dashed lines should 
match as closely as possible in the 
months before the mandates became 
effective. As seen, this is the case for all 
cities and states evaluated. Technical 
details aside, the difference in the 
outcome for postmandate months then 
illustrates the impact of the sick pay 
mandate on employment dynamics of 
the city or state.
As Figure 1 shows, there is little 
evidence that employment dynamics 
systematically either improved or 
worsened after the introduction of a 
sick pay mandate. The graphs look 
very similar when assessing the impact 
on wage growth in cities and states 
with sick pay mandates and when 
investigating specific industries, such 
as construction or hospitality. More 
details and results are in Pichler and 
Ziebarth (forthcoming). 
When carrying out formal 
statistical tests about the difference 
in employment and wage dynamics 
in treatment and synthetic control 
regions, these tests cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of no differences at 
conventional statistical levels. However, 
the statistical tests cannot exclude 
modest reductions in wage growth and 
employment with absolute statistical 
certainty, but nor do they find any 
evidence for them.
Implications for Policy and Practice
The United States is one of three 
OECD countries without universal 
access to paid sick leave. Opponents 
of sick pay mandates are mainly 
concerned with negative employment 
or wage effects. Yet, there is no strong 
evidence of systematic and disruptive 
labor market effects when cities and 
states mandate that employees have 
the right to earn and take sick days. 
Concerns of massive labor market 
disruptions are vastly overstated. 
The absence of major labor market 
disruptions may be a function of how 
the U.S. mandates are designed. In 
fact, they seem to be more incentive-
compatible than their European 
counterparts and minimize shirking 
behavior, a main concern of opponents. 
The reason for this incentive-
compatibility is that paid sick days are 
personalized, and employees “earn” 
them. For every 30–40 hours worked—
that is, for every full-time week of 
work—employees earn one hour of 
paid sick leave. Unused sick days roll 
over to the next year. Because earned 
sick days represent a personalized 
insurance credit (similar to health 
savings accounts) for future health 
shocks that are likely to occur (e.g., flu 
or illness of a child), we expect shirking 
to play a minimal role for most 
employees. 
However, wages and employment 
could still be significantly affected 
because of administrative burdens or 
psychological effects when employers 
overestimate the actual relevance 
for their businesses. The findings in 
Pichler and Ziebarth (forthcoming), 
however, show that this was very 
likely not the case. They are able to 
exclude employment losses of more 
than 2 percent and wage reductions of 
more than 3 percent at conventional 
statistical levels.
Together with research showing that 
influenza-like illness rates decrease as 
a result of the mandates (Pichler and 
Ziebarth 2017), this finding suggests 
that the mandates can be an effective 
tool to increase workers’ health and 
well-being. 
NOTE
1. For an overview, see https://www 
.abetterbalance.org/paid-sick-time-laws/ 
(accessed January 11, 2019).
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Nicolas R. Ziebarth is an associate professor at 
Cornell University, and Stefan Pichler is a research 
associate at ETH Zurich. 
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We do not find evidence that sick pay 
mandates kill jobs or systematically 
disrupt local labor markets.
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W.E. Upjohn Institute Welcomes Michael Horrigan as Its New President 
The W.E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research has chosen Michael 















his retirement from the president’s role last 
March after 25 years leading the Institute. 
Eberts remains with the Institute as a senior 
researcher.
Horrigan came to the BLS as a labor 
economist in 1986, after six years as an 
economics professor at Williams College in 
his native Massachusetts. He rose through 
the ranks as a division chief, the director 
of the National Longitudinal Surveys 
Program and assistant commissioner 
in two offices. He served as associate 
commissioner for the Offices of Prices and 
Living Conditions before taking his current 
role of associate commissioner in the Office 
of Unemployment and Unemployment 
Statistics in 2014.
In 1991, Horrigan was finishing a one-
year term as a senior labor economist with 
the Council of Economic Advisers when 
he met Eberts. “I was replacing him as one 
of the senior staff economists,” Eberts said. 
“Now he is replacing me as president of the 
Institute, more than 25 years later. In the 
interim, Mike has established himself as 
one of the premier labor economists in the 
country.”
Horrigan’s oversight of programs 
to produce and distribute key national 
employment indicators positions him 
well to steward the Institute’s research 
initiatives on vibrant local economies and on 
alternative work arrangements, said Donald 
R. Parfet, chair of the Upjohn Institute 
Board of Trustees. “His background in labor 
economics and numerous leadership roles 
at the BLS make him particularly well suited 
to guide the Institute on an exciting strategic 
path,” Parfet said.
“He has a lot of experience in this space 
and a real eagerness to lead us,” Parfet said. 
“He has the energetic drive to continue the 
work that Randy has started.”
In addition to providing vision and 
strategic direction, Horrigan also plans 
to continue his own research, potentially 
collaborating with Institute researchers 
on topics such as workforce development, 
automation and labor force participation. 
“The researchers are doing exceptional work 
and I’m looking forward to building on 
that research in a way that has even greater 
impact,” he said.
The Institute has focused on various 
topics over the years but draws strength from 
its unique position as a nonpartisan labor 
market research nonprofit that is narrowly 
focused on employment issues. “We 
absolutely will want to go deeper,” Horrigan 
said. “We want to leverage the things we 
know how to do really well, in a way that’s 
intentional.
“We’ll also look at going broader, while 
at the same time be disciplined about which 
initiatives we undertake,” he said. “We will 
not go beyond our reach.”
Horrigan and his family will move to 
Kalamazoo after his assignment begins. 
Although Horrigan got a taste of the 
Midwest during graduate work at Purdue 
University and has relatives in Michigan, 
he is still learning about the area. “There’s 
a lot more than I realized,” he said. “I’m 
excited about the education and cultural 
opportunities Kalamazoo has to offer for me 
and my family.”
NEW BOOK:  Investing in America’s Workforce
Improving Outcomes for Workers and Employers 
How can well-structured and effective 
workforce programs and policies result in 
better economic outcomes for individuals, 
businesses, and communities?
Explore contemporary research, best 
practices, and resources from more than 100 
authors in the book Investing in America’s 
Workforce: Improving Outcomes for Workers 
and Employers.
The book is divided into three volumes: 
1) Investing in Workers, 2) Investing in Work, 
and 3) Investing in Systems for Employment 
Opportunity. Each volume contains discrete 
sections made up of chapters that identify 
specific workforce development programs 
and policies that provide positive returns to 
society, to employers, and to job seekers. 
Download the three volumes and 
individual chapters for free at https://www 
.investinwork.org/book.
Investing in America’s Workforce is 
a Federal Reserve System initiative in 
collaboration with the John J. Heldrich 
Center for Workforce Development at 
Rutgers University, the Ray Marshall 
Center of the Lyndon B. Johnson School 
at the University of Texas, and the 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment 
Research.
Note: The policies and practices presented 
in the book are intended to spur innovative 
thinking that results in context-specific 
solutions. The perspectives are not intended 
as an endorsement from the Federal Reserve 
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